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Chapter pages in book: (237 - 248)Almost one of every six elderly Medicare beneﬁciaries suﬀers from some
disability (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004). Reduc-
tions in the prevalence and severity of disability could have dramatic eﬀects
on well-being; moreover, because the disabled spend more on health care
than the nondisabled, lower rates of disability could reduce medical spend-
ing (Liu, Wall, and Wissoker 1997, Chan et al. 2002). For example, using
data on Medicare beneﬁciaries between 1992 and 2000, Chernew et al.
(2005) report that on average, the total medical care spending of people
with one or two Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) was about twice that of
nondisabled elderly. In contrast, people with ﬁve or more ADLs incurred
four to ﬁve times the medical care spending of people without disability.
Similarly, Cutler and Meara (1999) report that expenditure for persons with
ﬁve or more activity limitations was nearly ﬁve times the amount incurred
by those with Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) conditions.
Several studies in the health services literature posit that reduced dis-
ability levels in the future will lead to considerable cost savings. For ex-
ample, Waidmann and Liu (2000) suggest that if disability rates continue
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DeBakey Foundation.their current decline, the number of disabled elderly people will not grow
either in absolute terms or relative to the size of the working-aged popula-
tion, even in the face of the dramatic growth in the elderly population. Lu-
bitz et al. (2003) show that the savings of improved health might oﬀset the
health care costs associated with longer life. Even though healthier people
live longer, their total expected medical care expenses appear to be no
greater than those for less healthy persons.
Yet Chernew et al. (2005) report that spending growth among the least
disabled was faster than that among the more disabled. After adjustment
for a range of covariates including demographic and health status, spend-
ing by the nondisabled and beneﬁciaries with only IADL disability grew 23
percent and 28 percent, respectively. This compares to a 10 percent in-
crease for those with one or two ADLs, a 0.6 percent increase for those
with three or four ADLs, and a 10 percent decrease for most disabled. As
a result, the ratio of spending among the ADL disabled groups, relative to
the nondisabled, declined over the study period. Thus, projections of cost
savings based on the current pattern of spending by disability status may
overstate the savings associated with improved disability.
This work expands upon the existing literature by exploring the spend-
ing trends by disability category for speciﬁc types of health care services.
If a greater number of major procedures are performed on the less dis-
abled, we would expect to see greater convergence in spending for inpatient
services. If less disabled individuals are increasingly receiving expensive 
diagnostic tests or preventive services, relative to the more disabled, we
would expect to see strong convergence in spending for physician and out-
patient services. Greater use of medications among the less disabled, per-
haps to manage chronic—though not necessarily disabling—conditions,
would yield convergence in pharmaceutical spending across disability cat-
egories.
The pattern of results suggests that the convergence in spending is driven
by reductions in spending for long-term care services. This reﬂects, in part,
the eﬀects of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which limited spending on
long-term care. Because these services were disproportionately used by the
most disabled, this led to a convergence of spending across disability
groups. In addition to the eﬀects of long-term care spending, we also ﬁnd
that pharmaceutical spending contributed to the convergence of spending
across groups. In contrast to long-term care, where spending growth was
constrained, spending on prescription medications was rapid in all disabil-
ity groups. However, it was most rapid in the least disabled groups, leading
to convergence in spending. Finally, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
cost growth in inpatient care and provider/outpatient care was the same
across disability categories.
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To estimate the trends in spending by disability group, we model total
spending by Medicare beneﬁciaries (program spending plus beneﬁciary
out-of-pocket spending) as a function of disability, other covariates (in-
cluding disease burden), and a set of parameters. Estimates are conducted
separately for total spending and four subcategories of spending: inpatient
payments, outpatient and physician payments, prescription drug pay-
ments, and long-term care payments (hospice, home care, skilled nursing
home, and facility).
Changes in Medicare spending over time will reﬂect either changes in the
distribution of covariates (including disability) or changes in the coeﬃ-
cients that relate those covariates to spending. We estimate a nonlinear re-
gression model of the form:
E[spendingit | xit] = exp(xit   )
For services in which more than 90 percent of beneﬁciaries have some
spending (total spending and provider/ outpatient spending), we estimate
this model as a single-equation generalized linear model (GLM) where the
variance of spending has a Gaussian distribution. In spending categories
in which more than 10 percent of beneﬁciaries had no spending in a year,
we estimate spending as a two part model, where the ﬁrst part is a probit
regression predicting positive spending (versus no spending in the cate-
gory), and the second part is the GLM model described above, estimated
on only those individuals with positive spending. Predicted spending by
disability category and joint tests of the hypothesis that spending growth
did not diﬀer by disability category were based on analysis combining the
estimates from both parts of the model.
To examine convergence of spending across disability categories, we in-
clude in all models interactions between covariates (most importantly dis-
ability category) and a linear time trend. We dropped the time interactions
for those domains and disease states in which the estimates for total
spending suggested the coeﬃcients were stable over time. These dropped
interaction terms include the interactions of time with: age, education,
gender, race, region of residence, urban/rural, and marriage status. The
dropping of the interaction terms signiﬁes stability of the eﬀects of these
variables over time. The corresponding variables not interacted with time
were retained in the model and were often important predictors of expen-
ditures.
The GLM speciﬁcation was based on speciﬁcation tests of the total
spending model. Relative to an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model and
a similar nonlinear model that assumed a Gamma distribution instead of
a Gaussian distribution, our model had lower mean average prediction er-
rors using both a split sample approach and a set of models which were
Disability and Spending Growth 239estimated on data from 1992 through a given year (t) and then used results
to predict expenditures in periods after t through 2000. We estimated sev-
eral such models using diﬀerent years to deﬁne t.
Because disability is a marker of disease, a portion of the association be-
tween spending and disability may not be causal. Higher spending on in-
dividuals with disabilities may reﬂect eﬀorts to treat the underlying disease
that caused the disability. Moreover, if individuals with disabilities are dis-
proportionately in poorer health (in unobserved ways) than other individ-
uals, higher spending may reﬂect eﬀorts to treat unrelated diseases.
8.2 Data
Our analysis is based on data from the 1992–2000 panels of the Medicare
Current Beneﬁciary Survey (MCBS). The MCBS is a rotating panel survey
in which a nationally representative sample of Medicare beneﬁciaries com-
pletes twelve interviews over three years. The survey is designed to ascer-
tain utilization and expenditures for the Medicare population. Our anal-
ysis is conﬁned to respondents enrolled in Medicare Part A and/or Part B
and over sixty-ﬁve years of age. Beneﬁciaries eighty-ﬁve years of age or
over are over-sampled. The MCBS provides demographic data including
age, sex, race, and educational attainment. It also contains self-reported
information on health, including the prevalence of various conditions, and
measures of physical limitation in performing ADLs and IADLs.
8.2.1 Measuring Costs
Our measure of spending is based on Medicare claims data, linked to the
MCBS and supplemented by respondent self-reports. Total spending in-
cludes both program spending and beneﬁciary out-of-pocket spending 
(Eppig and Chulis 1997). We include spending for all health care services
(inpatient, outpatient, physician, pharmaceutical, nursing home, and home 
care). For services covered by Medicare, the data captures both the spend-
ing by Medicare, other payers including Medicaid, and by the beneﬁciary.
Spending for services not covered by Medicare is based on self-reports and
may be underreported. Spending by Medicare beneﬁciaries enrolled in
HMOs is imputed based on measures of service utilization. All spending
was converted to 2000 dollars using the consumer price index. The price in-
dex conversion will not inﬂuence relative spending across service types or
disability groups.
8.2.2 Measuring Disability
Our measure of disability is derived from limitations in Activities of Daily
Living (ADLs) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs).There
are six ADLs: eating, bathing, dressing, transferring, walking, and toilet-
ing. There are eight IADLs: telephoning, using transportation, grocery
shopping, personal shopping, housekeeping, chores, managing medica-
240 Michael E. Chernew, Dana Goldman, Feng Pan, and Baoping Shangtions, and managing money (Evashwick 2001). Activities of Daily Living
and IADLs are measured on a ﬁve-point scale ranging from independent,
requiring supervision, limited assistance, extensive assistance, or total de-
pendence. Thus, the level of disability may be inﬂuenced not only by phys-
ical limitations, but also by the respondent’s environment and social situa-
tion. For an ADL or IADL, we consider any respondent reporting that
they require any supervision or assistance to suﬀer from that ADL. We
then aggregate the disability measures into ﬁve categories commonly used
in the literature: nondisabled, those with IADL only, with one or two
ADLs, with three or four ADLs, and those with ﬁve or more ADLs (Liu,
Wall, and Wissoker 1997; Cutler and Meara 1999; Manton and Gu 2001).
Beneﬁciaries residing in nursing homes do not report their disability sta-
tus on a consistent basis. For this reason we treat nursing home residence
as a separate category, which though related to disability, is not a direct
measure of disability. Some community-dwelling elderly may suﬀer from
greater disability than some nursing home residents.
8.2.3 Measuring Disease
Disease measured in the MCBS is based on self-report of whether the re-
spondent has ever been told by a doctor that he had a list of important con-
ditions. We capture the presence of diabetes, cancer, heart disease, stroke,
Alzheimer’s disease, hypertension, osteoarthritis, and lung disease using a
series of indicator variables.
8.2.4 Other Covariates
We control for a range of demographic information such as age (dummy
variables for ages sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine, seventy to seventy-four, seventy-
ﬁve to seventy-nine, eighty to eighty-four, eighty-ﬁve and over), gender,
marriage status, race (white, black, Hispanic), education (less than eleven,
twelve to ﬁfteen, more than sixteen), region of residence (Midwest, West,
Northeast, South, and other [Puerto Rico]). We also control for behavioral
markers: current or former smoker; BMI category (obese, overweight, un-
derweight); and supplemental insurance coverage (Part A only, Part B only,
Medicaid, employer supplemental, private supplemental, and HMO).
8.3 Results
Each model yields two sets of coeﬃcients. One set measures the eﬀect of
the relevant covariate in the base year (1992) and the other set measures
how the eﬀect of each covariate changes over time (the coeﬃcients on the
time interactions).
The base coeﬃcients consistently indicate that spending rises as disabil-
ity get worse (table 8.1). This is true for aggregate spending and for each cat-
egory of spending. Spending on inpatient care exhibits the largest absolute
diﬀerential in spending between the most disabled community-dwelling













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.beneﬁciaries (more than ﬁve ADLs) and the nondisabled. This is followed
closely by the diﬀerential for long-term care spending. Because the nondis-
abled spend so little on long-term care, the ratio of spending by beneﬁciaries
with ﬁve or more ADLs, relative to the nondisabled, is greatest for long-term
care spending. Speciﬁcally, in 1992 adjusted spending for the most disabled
community dwelling elderly was over sixty-ﬁve times as much as adjusted
spending for nondisabled community dwelling. Spending for prescription
drugs is the least inﬂuenced by disability. The ratio of predicted spending on
prescription medications for beneﬁciaries with ﬁve or more ADLs in the
base year was only about twice that for the nondisabled.
Though the level of spending for the least disabled was much below that
for the most disabled, the second set of coeﬃcients from each model indi-
cates that spending by the least disabled was growing at the fastest rate
(table 8.2). As a result, the ratio of spending for the most disabled, relative
to the least disabled was falling. Our estimates suggest that in 1992, spend-
ing by community-dwelling beneﬁciaries with ﬁve or more ADLs was 4.7
times greater than otherwise comparable nondisabled beneﬁciaries. That
ratio fell to 3.3 by 2000.
Examination of spending patterns reveals that most of this decline is
driven by trends in long-term care spending. Estimated spending by the
nondisabled remained low, but average annual spending by those with ﬁve
or more ADLs, adjusted for demographic and other covariates, fell by
about 7 percent. Closer examination of the data indicates that this was
driven by a decline in home care spending following the Balanced Budget
Act (BBA) of 1997. These ﬁndings reﬂect both a drop in the probability of
any use and a drop in the amount of spending conditional on use. This is
consistent with the study by Spector et al. (2004), which documents a re-
duction in home care spending overall following the BBA. The decline in
home care spending was present for all disability groups, so the decline in
the ratio of long-term care spending for the most disabled, relative to the
least disabled was reasonably smooth, without a big break around the
BBA. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 8.1, which reports the ratio of mean
spending (unadjusted for covariates), for total long-term care spending
and its two largest components, home care and care in short-term facilities.
However, because long-term care is more salient for the disabled, the re-
duction in spending associated with long-term care drives the reduction in
the relative spending by the most disabled group.
The estimates for physician services and inpatient services do not reveal
a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerential in the spending trends between the
most and least disabled. In fact, for inpatient care the estimates suggest
that if other beneﬁciary traits remained unchanged from 1992, the relative
spending gap between the most and least disabled community-dwelling el-
derly would have risen.
For pharmaceutical spending, growth was rapid among all categories of




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.disability, but most rapid among the least disabled. Although the coeﬃ-
cient on the interaction between ﬁve or more ADLs and time is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant, the point estimates suggests greater growth in spending
for the nondisabled and the coeﬃcients on the time interactions for the
other two ADL disability groups are statistically signiﬁcant. Although the
relatively rapid growth in prescription drug spending among the nondis-
abled contributes to the decline in the ratio of spending by the most dis-
abled, relative to the least disabled, the contribution of prescription drug
spending to the overall decline is less than that of long-term care because
the share of spending on pharmaceuticals is much lower on average (5 per-
cent of spending for the most disabled and 14 percent for the nondisabled).
The results comparing the nondisabled to disability groups other than
the most disabled reveal a similar pattern of spending ratios for the dis-
abled relative to the nondisabled group. Overall, only the IADL-only
group has very similar spending growth as the nondisabled group. In part
this is because, like the nondisabled group, the IADL-only group has very
limited spending on long-term care, which was the primary driver of the
declining relative spending by the most disabled.
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Fig. 8.1 Ratio of Long-Term Care spending, by type of Long-Term CareThe other ADL groups have slower spending growth in aggregate than
the nondisabled (and IADL-only) group. Again, this reﬂects largely less
spending on long-term care and somewhat slower growth in pharmaceuti-
cal spending relative to the less disabled groups.
8.4 Conclusion
During the 1990s, spending growth for the least disabled exceeded that
by the most disabled. This resulted in a convergence of spending between
the two groups of beneﬁciaries. If such a convergence continues, savings
accruing to improved disability status may have less of an impact on over-
all spending than analysis of current spending patterns would suggest.
This analysis reveals that the convergence of spending reﬂects the re-
duction in long-term care spending following the BBA. While all disability
groups experienced a decline in long-term care spending, the aggregate
spending for the most disabled was most aﬀected because long-term care
spending is about a quarter of all spending for the most disabled group and
less than 5 percent of spending for the nondisabled group.
A fundamental question is whether this convergence will continue. To a
large extent the answer depends on decisions by policymakers. The Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997 was a major reason for the decline in long-term
care spending, and thus an important contributor to the convergence in
spending. If policymakers can hold the line on long-term care spending,
one might expect to continue to observe slower relative spending growth
among the most disabled. Moreover, it may be the case that technical in-
novations that drive spending growth are less salient for long-term care
services, suggesting that pressures for increased spending on those ser-
vices, per beneﬁciary, will be manageable.
In contrast, technical innovations related to physician, inpatient, and
pharmaceutical services appear to aﬀect beneﬁciaries in all disability
groups. In fact, some innovations, such as those related to prescription
drugs, were generally more salient for the least disabled group of beneﬁci-
aries. As these services consume a growing share of spending, we would
forecast greater cost pressures. Like long-term care spending, spending for
physician, inpatient, and pharmaceutical services will be sensitive to regu-
latory changes. Yet historically, constraining the growth of these services
has appeared a more diﬃcult task.
As we are faced with a growing number of Medicare beneﬁciaries, the
challenge for policymakers will be to design payment systems and other
regulations in a way as to promote eﬃcient delivery of care and allocation
of services. The political tradeoﬀs will be diﬃcult to make and budgetary
pressures great. Our analysis suggests that it is unlikely that improved dis-
ability status among elderly will eliminate the need for these tough choices.
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